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1. Introduction 
     The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between Taiwan and 
China was signed on 29 June 2010. As with FTAs observed widely around the world, 
the scope of the agreement includes reducing tariffs, eliminating non-tariff trade barriers, 
promoting trade and investment contacts, and boosting economic development and 
employment. Previously, Taiwan had concluded FTAs only with a number of small 
Central American countries. These FTAs had been concluded mainly for political rather 
than economic reasons (Dent, 2009). On the other hand, the ECFA seems to be 
motivated by economic reasons, at least compared with Taiwan’s other FTAs. The 
crucial event was the conclusion of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The 
Agreement on Trade in Goods was signed in 2004 and implemented on 1 July 2005 by 
the ASEAN countries and on 20 July 2005 by China. Under this agreement, the six 
original ASEAN members and China were obliged to eliminate tariffs on 90% of their 
products by 2010, while Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam have until 2015 
to do so. As a result, the majority of exports from ASEAN countries to China enjoy the 
lower tariff rates. Since Taiwanese firms have competed in the China market with firms 
from a number of ASEAN countries, Taiwanese companies were anxious about their 
position regarding market access. Taiwan therefore concluded the ECFA with China in 
order to resolve this disadvantage in the China market, (Chen et al., 2011). 
     The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to investigate empirically how 
early harvest products are selected. As of 2011, regarding tariff removal, the ECFA 
simply began tariff reduction on products listed in the early harvest program. Under the 
program, China implemented tariff reductions on 539 items originating in the Taiwan 
region, including agricultural products, chemical products, mechanical products, 
electronic products, automobile parts, textile products, light industrial products, 
metallurgical products, instrumental products, and medical products.1 In this paper, we 
investigate empirically how these 539 products were selected. For example, we 
explored whether or not the products with the larger margin between ACFTA rates and 
most-favored nation (MFN) rates in China were more likely to be selected as early 
harvest products. The second purpose is to explore for what kinds of products of the 539 
the higher utilization of FTA preferential rates can be seen. Specifically, we examine the 
roles of the margin between general tariff rates and FTA preferential rates and the 
                                                 
1 Tariff reduction by the Taiwan region was carried out for 268 products in four categories 
originating in China, including petroleum chemicals, mechanical products, and textile products, 
among others. 
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restrictiveness of rules of origin (ROOs). As conceptualized in the following sections, 
these two types of elements are major determinants of FTA utilization. 
     This paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, our analysis on 
the selection of products with preferential rates is related to studies in the literature of 
endogenous tariff/protection formation. This literature is extremely large and examines 
how industrial tariff/protection is determined. The major references include Ball (1967), 
Stigler (1971), Pincus (1975), Caves (1976), Hillman (1982), Mayer (1984), Grossman 
and Helpman (1994, 1995), Cadot et al. (1997), Mitra (1999), Gawande et al. (2006), 
and Bombardini (2008). Specifically, these studies have shed light on industrial 
characteristics (characteristics empirically definable at the industry level) including the 
extent of industry concentration, the magnitude of import penetration, production 
processes, capital-labor ratio, the prevalence of intra-industry trade, the level of wages, 
the significance of employment size, trade creation, and the distribution of firm 
productivity (Olarreaga and Soloaga, 1998). In this paper, while controlling for such 
industry-specific elements by introducing industry dummy variables, we focus on 
product-specific elements. In particular, as mentioned above, our interest lies in whether 
or not the ECFA early harvest products are more likely to be chosen from among 
products with the larger margin between general rates and ACFTA rates. This 
hypothesis is similar to the finding of Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008); MFN 
rates are likely to be lower in the case of products with the lower preferential rates. 
However, our paper differs in terms of examining how one type of preferential tariff 
rates depends on another type of preferential rates. 
The second contribution, which is related to the first, is that we take into account 
the selection of products with FTA preferential rates in our analysis on FTA utilization. 
There are several papers analyzing the determinants of FTA utilization: Bureau et al. 
(2007), Cadot et al. (2006), Francois et al. (2006), Hakobyan (2010), and Manchin 
(2006). The elements examined in the determinants of FTA utilization are almost 
identical across all papers, including the margin between general tariff rates and 
preferential tariff rates, size of trade, restrictiveness of ROOs, and so on. Thus almost 
the same results are obtained in the literature; for example, FTA utilization rates are 
higher in products with a larger tariff margin. While all of the previous studies take a list 
of products with FTA rates as given, the products with the FTA preferential rates should 
be systematically selected. In particular, as mentioned above, the tariff reduction started 
from a very limited number of products in the case of the ECFA. Those products seem 
to have been selected on the basis of several different motivations on the part of China 
and Taiwan. For example, Taiwan attempted to include in the early harvest list the 
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products for which tariff elimination is expected to yield larger benefits. This story is 
not limited to the case of the ECFA. Almost all FTAs available in the world exclude 
some products, particularly products in the so-called exclusion list, from the list of 
products for which tariff reduction is implemented. Thus, due to restricting sample 
products only to the products with FTA rates, the estimators in the previous studies will 
have suffered from the well-known sample selection bias. In this paper, we tackle this 
sample selection bias by employing the Heckman estimation technique. Namely, we 
first estimate the equation for the kinds of products that obtain FTA preferential 
treatment. Secondly, we estimate the equation for the determinants of FTA utilization by 
introducing an inverse of the Mills ratio estimated in the selection equation. Thus our 
estimators show the consistent ones in the determinants of ECFA utilization. 
Our third contribution is one that is specific to studies on ECFA. This is the first 
paper in terms of evaluating the ECFA using the ex-post data. So far, there are few 
previous studies on the ECFA (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; Hong and Yang, 2011). These 
studies conducted an ex-ante evaluation of the ECFA by simulating the well-known 
Global Trade Analysis Project model. This paper, on the other hand, attempts to 
evaluate, to some extent, how effectively the ECFA is used by employing data on how 
much the ECFA is used. This analysis is important, particularly in the context of the 
ECFA, because the two parties have not yet even begun negotiations on tariff removal 
beyond the early harvest program. That is, the results of our analysis contribute to 
predicting how effectively the normal/sensitive track of the ECFA will work in the 
future. In addition, our analysis uncovers which products should have been included in 
the early harvest list on the China side but were excluded. Those products might be seen 
as “sensitive products” for China. Therefore, a list of such products will be useful for 
Taiwan in negotiating tariff removal beyond the early harvest program. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section is an 
overview of the ECFA. Section 3 provides our empirical framework for examining the 
determinants of ECFA utilization. After taking a look at ECFA utilization in Section 4, 
we present our estimation results in Section 5. Lastly, Section 6 concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. ECFA 
This section introduces the method for tariff removal in the ECFA early harvest 
products, the preferential level of ECFA tariff rates, and the rules of origin in the ECFA. 
First, the tariff removal method in the ECFA is systematically determined based on the 
level of MFN rates in 2009. The three types of tariff removal schedule for the ECFA in 
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China are as follows: (I) tariff rates on products with MFN rates from 0% to 5% in 2009 
decrease to 0% in the first year or 2011; (II) tariff rates on products with MFN rates 
from 5% to 15% in 2009 decrease to 5% in the first year (2011) and 0% in the second 
year (2012); and (III) tariff rates on products with MFN rates higher than 15% in 2009 
decrease to 10% in the first year (2011), 5% in the second year (2012), and 0% in the 
third year (2013). In short, tariff removal for the ECFA early harvest products will be 
completed in the year 2013. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
     How preferential are the ECFA tariff rates? To answer this question, we compare 
the ECFA rates with the tariff rates in some other FTAs. In particular, we shed light on 
the preferential tariff rates on China’s imports from Korea and ASEAN countries since 
those countries are the main competitors of Taiwanese firms in the China market. Korea 
enjoys preferential tariff rates based on the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), 
signed in 1975 as an initiative of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). APTA is a preferential tariff arrangement that aims at 
promoting intra-regional trade through exchange of mutually agreed concessions by the 
member countries Bangladesh, China, India, Korea, Lao PDR and Sri Lanka. As 
mentioned in the introductory section, ASEAN countries enjoy preferential status in the 
China market due to the conclusion of ACFTA. ECFA, APTA, and ACFTA preferential 
tariff data for China are drawn from the official ECFA website,2 China Customs Law 
Firm online,3 and China FTA Network online,4 respectively. We also refer to the World 
Integrated Trade Solution tariff database,5 ACFTA knowledge handbook,6 and MFN 
rates adjustment tables of the Department of Finance, Ministry of Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China.7  
Table 2 shows a comparison of ECFA rates with China’s MFN rates, APTA rates 
for Korea, and ACFTA rates in 2011, 2012, and 2013. We find that, in 2011, 77% of the 
ECFA products have less than a 5% tariff margin between ECFA and MFN rates. In 
particular, due to the reduction of MFN rates, there is already no margin for six products. 
However, from 2012, most of the ECFA products have more than a 5% margin. The 
                                                 
2 Official ECFA website: www.ecfa.org.tw (accessed on 15 September 2010) 
3 http://www.customslawyer.cn/hgsz/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=44116 
4 http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
5 http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/ 
6 http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/table/acfta_manual.pdf 
7 http://cws.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
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literature estimates the FTA compliance costs to be around 5% (see, for example, Cadot 
and de Melo, 2007; Hayakawa, 2011). In other words, firms tend to use FTA schemes if 
the tariff margin between FTA and MFN rates is higher than 5%. Thus ECFA rates 
might be more frequently used from 2012. Second, in 2011, 93% of the ECFA products 
already had lower tariff rates than APTA products. Third, 84% of the ECFA products 
still had higher tariff rates than ACFTA products in 2011. Most of the ECFA products 
have higher tariff rates than ACFTA products, implying that ECFA rates in 2011 were 
not low enough to compete with ASEAN countries in terms of preferential access. The 
ECFA rates have become as competitive as ACFTA rates from 2012. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
Figure 1 shows the 10 ROO types in ECFA. CS, CH, and CC are the ROO criteria 
of “Change in Subheading,” “Change in Heading,” and “Change in Chapter,” 
respectively. WO indicates the “Wholly obtained” criterion. RVCL and RVCH are the 
ROO criteria for the less than 40% real value-added and the greater than 40% real 
value-added, respectively. Roughly speaking, severity increases in the order of CS, CH, 
CC, RVCL, RVCH, and WO. Furthermore, when these are combined by AND, severity 
increases, and becomes looser when combined by OR. We find that around 75% of the 
ECFA products have “Change in Heading” or “Change in Chapter” as rules of origin, 
and around 20% of the ECFA products have “AND-type” rules of origin, namely 
CS&RVCH, CH&RVCL, CH&RVCH, and CC&RVCL. Thus, in the case of ECFA, 
ROOs may not have seriously negative impacts on the use of ECFA tariff schemes. 
 
===   Figure 1   === 
 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
     As mentioned in the introductory section, we employ the Heckman estimation 
technique. Namely, we first estimate the equation for the kinds of products that obtain 
FTA preferential treatment. We call such products “FTA products.” Thus, our first step 
estimates the equation for the selection on FTA products. We then estimate the equation 
for FTA utilization by introducing an inverse of the Mills ratio estimated in the selection 
equation. In this section, we first specify the selection equation and then the equation 
for FTA utilization. 
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3.1. Selection of FTA Products 
     In this subsection, we specify the selection equation for FTA products. To do this, 
as mentioned in the introductory section, the literature of endogenous tariff/protection 
formation is helpful. In this literature, studies explore how the level of protection in an 
industry is determined. In this paper, while controlling the industry-specific elements by 
introducing industry dummy variables, we focus on product-specific elements. 
Specifically, our selection equation is formalized as follows: 
 
Prob (FTA Productsp = 1|X) = β0 + β1 (MFNp (t−1)) + β2 Taiwanese Exports Chinap (t−1) 
+ β3 (MFNp (t−1) − ACFTAp (t−1)) + β4 Chinese RCAp (t−1) 
+ β5 Taiwanese RCAp (t−1) + β6 Intra-industry Tradep (t−1) + ui + ηp.  (1) 
 
The dependent variable, FTA Productsp, is an indicator variable taking unity if product p 
is included in the early harvest list and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables take 
values existing in the year before the ECFA’s entry into force. ui is the industry dummy 
variable (defined in the Section on tariff classification). 
     Our product-specific explanatory variables are as follows. We first introduce 
China’s MFN rates on Taiwanese products, MFNp (t−1). From the theoretical point of 
view, Taiwan will try to include into the early harvest list the products for which tariff 
elimination is expected to yield larger benefits. As discussed in the next subsection, 
such larger benefits can be expected for products with higher general rates, namely 
MFN rates. In order to examine this hypothesis, we introduce China’s MFN rates on 
Taiwanese products. 
     Second, we examine the role of the past magnitude of exports from Taiwan to 
China, which is denoted by Taiwanese Exports Chinap (t−1). If exporting countries try 
to open the market for more protected products, products with the smaller volume of 
exports may be selected as FTA products. On the other hand, if imports of a product 
were large before FTA conclusion, their further increase due to tariff reduction through 
FTAs may yield a less drastic industrial adjustment in the market in importing countries. 
In short, importing countries may more easily accept the inclusion in FTA products of 
products whose import volume is already large. As a result, many forces are at work, 
and the net result would depend upon the relative strength of these forces. 
     Third, we introduce the tariff margin between ACFTA rates and MFN rates in 
China, which is our main variable in this equation. As mentioned in the previous section, 
Taiwan competes with ASEAN countries in the China market. Therefore, so as not to be 
disadvantaged against ASEAN countries in terms of tariff rates, Taiwan may attempt to 
8 
 
include in the early harvest list products with large tariff margins in ACFTA. China is 
also more likely to accept the granting of preferential treatment for products that are 
already included in other FTAs. As found in Table 2, since APTA rates for Korea are not 
so different from those of MFN, we do not examine the margin between APTA rates and 
MFN rates. 
     Fourth, we include China’s and Taiwan’s competitiveness measures. On the one 
hand, trade liberalization regarding products for which China has competitiveness in 
producing will not yield a drastic increase in Taiwanese exports of those products. 
Namely, China may more easily accept the inclusion of such products into the early 
harvest list. On the other hand, Taiwan must try to include products for which Taiwan 
has competitiveness in producing. In order to examine these effects, we introduce the 
revealed comparative advantage indices for China and Taiwan. Specifically, for example, 
China’s index is calculated as [(Chinese exports of product p to the world/Chinese total 
exports to the world)/(World exports of product p/World total exports)]. Since the larger 
index means a larger comparative advantage, it is expected that both variables will have 
positive coefficients. 
     Lastly, the extent of intra-industry trade is examined. As Levy (1997) argues, 
while an increase in intra-industry trade benefits all agents, an increase in inter-industry 
trade has the usual Stolper-Samuelson redistributive effects and thus yields more serious 
conflict. Therefore, products with a larger extent of intra-industry trade will be more 
likely to be selected because of the easier acceptance by firms producing such products. 
Following Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998), we measure the extent of intra-industry trade 
using [(Taiwanese imports from China − Taiwanese exports to China)2/(Taiwanese 
imports from China + Taiwanese exports to China)2]0.5. 
     Our data sources for this analysis are as follows. The information on tariff rates is 
the same as in the previous section. All trade data are obtained from the World Trade 
Atlas (Global Trade Information Services). Chinese and Taiwanese RCA indicators are 
calculated using the trade data of the respective countries, these data also being drawn 
from the World Trade Atlas. We set times t and t−1 as 2011 and 2009, respectively since, 
as mentioned in the previous section, the method for tariff removal in the ECFA is 
systematically determined based on the level of MFN rates in 2009. 
 
3.2. FTA Utilization 
Our conceptual framework on firms’ FTA utilization is as follows. As explored in 
previous studies, the use of FTA schemes is dependent upon their benefit and cost. The 
major benefit is that firms can save the tariff payment when exporting. If firms choose 
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to use an FTA scheme, then they can export their products using the FTA preferential 
tariff rates (tFTA). Otherwise, they must pay the general tariff rates (tMFN), which are 
mostly MFN rates. Therefore, a larger difference between FTA rates and MFN rates 
leads to a larger amount of tariff payment saving. In other words, the larger the tariff 
margin, the more likely the firms are to use FTA schemes. 
On the other hand, the cost of FTA utilization is the “procurement adjustment 
cost.” For the use of an FTA scheme, firms need to secure the ROOs of their product, 
which are the criteria for determining the origin of goods. Compliance with the ROO 
requirement may force firms to change procurement origins, which would raise their 
procurement costs, since the original procurement arrangements should have been 
optimal. Thus the unit cost in the case of FTA (cFTA) is as high as or higher than that in 
the case of general rates (cMFN): cFTA ≥ cMFN. The difference in unit costs will depend on 
how restrictive the ROOs are for firms. In other words, the less restrictive the ROOs, 
the more likely the firms are to use FTA schemes for their exports. 
In sum, the crucial elements for FTA utilization are the magnitude of tariff margin 
and the restrictiveness of ROOs. In order to examine these elements empirically, we 
estimate the following equation8: 
 
ln FTA Utilizationp = β0 + β1 ln (MFNp − ECFAp) + ROOp γ + ui + εp.  (2) 
 
FTA Utilizationp is the magnitude of FTA utilization in product p. MFNp and ECFAp are 
MFN rates and ECFA preferential rates, respectively. ROOp is a vector of dummy 
variables regarding ROO types, which are listed in the previous section. We also include 
the industry dummy variable. The coefficient for tariff margin (i.e. β1) is expected to be 
significantly positive. A vector of coefficients for ROO dummy variables (γ) is expected 
to show how differently each ROO type affects FTA utilization. A more restrictive ROO 
type will have a larger negative coefficient.  
     Our data sources for this analysis are as follows. The source of MFN and ECFA 
rates is the same as in the previous section. The type of ROO in each product can be 
identified in the legal text of the ECFA. In this paper, unlike in the previous studies 
listed in the introductory section, “FTA Utilization” is defined as the number of 
certificates of origin (COOs) divided by exports, since we could not obtain the data on 
Taiwanese exports under the ECFA schemes. From the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
Taiwan, we were only able to obtain data on the number of COOs issued for Taiwanese 
                                                 
8 Following the previous studies, we take a log of variables. However, the results would be 
qualitatively unchanged even if non-logged variables had been used. 
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preferential exports to China. Although this is a serious data disadvantage compared 
with the previous studies, we later attempt to minimize the qualitative differences in the 
measure of FTA utilization. In order to normalize those numbers among products, we 
divide by exports. Also, since our data on the number of COOs are those at the 
Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit level, the unit of our empirical analysis is, of necessity, 
the HS 6-digit level. The tariff margin is thus calculated at the 6-digit level by taking its 
6-digit level average among products at the tariff line level (9-digit level).9 Fortunately, 
there are no differences in ROOs among products at the 9-digit level within the same 
6-digit classification. 
 
 
4. Overview of ECFA Utilization 
In this section, we take a brief look at how much the ECFA rates are utilized and 
how much the ECFA increases the exports of Taiwan to China. Table 3 reports 
utilization of FTAs in Taiwanese exports in 2011. “COO” is the number of COOs issued. 
The COO divided by exports is taken as the “utilization rate” of the FTA. We find that 
the number of COOs issued is large in ‘Plastics and rubber’ and ‘Machinery.’ In 
particular, taking the number of tariff lines with FTA rates into account, we can say that 
the number of COO in ‘Plastics and rubber’ is outstanding. Normalizing it by dividing 
by exports, we can see a very high rate of utilization in ‘Leather products.’ However, it 
is obvious that this measure of FTA utilization depends on a number of factors in 
addition to the “pure” utilization of the FTA. For example, an industry in which values 
per unit are generally larger will have larger exports, resulting in lower utilization. 
Namely, the differences in our utilization measures among industries are based not only 
on the utilization of the FTA but also on industry characteristics. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, we expect a more frequent use of ECFA 
rates for products with larger tariff margins. If this is correct, we may be able to see a 
more drastic increase in Taiwanese exports for such products. Table 4 shows the 
changes in Taiwanese exports to China from 2009 to 2011. “Margin” is the difference 
between ECFA rates and MFN rates for China. On average, ECFA products do not 
                                                 
9 We also take the 6-digit level average of each variable in the selection equation among products at 
the tariff line level. The dependent variable takes unity if any of the products within the same 
classification at the 6-digit level are listed in the early harvest products and zero otherwise. 
11 
 
experience a greater increase of exports to China than non-ECFA products. In this sense, 
it is unclear whether or not ECFA contributes to a boosting of trade from Taiwan to 
China. However, consistent with our expectation, a greater increase of exports to China 
can be seen in ECFA products with a larger tariff margin. The products with small, 
medium, and large margins have experienced export increases of 36%, 89%, and 96%, 
respectively. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
     In this section, we report our estimation results on the equations specified in the 
previous section. We first provide the results for the selection equation, i.e. (1), and then 
those for FTA utilization, i.e. (2). Robustness checks are also conducted. 
 
5.1. Results for the Selection of FTA Products 
     The results for the selection equation are reported in column (I) in Table 5. There 
are five noteworthy points. First, the coefficient for MFN is estimated to be insignificant. 
This result is inconsistent with our hypothesis that Taiwan includes products with larger 
potential benefits from tariff removal in the early harvest list. Second, based on the 
significantly positive coefficient for Taiwanese exports to China, we can say that 
importing countries easily accept the inclusion of products that they have already been 
importing in substantial amounts. Third, the coefficient for Tariff Margin in ACFTA is 
also significantly positive. Namely, Taiwan attempts to include products for which 
ASEAN countries have better access to the China market. Fourth, both the Chinese and 
Taiwanese RCA have insignificant coefficients. Lastly, the coefficient for Intra-industry 
Trade is estimated to be significantly positive, indicating that products with a larger 
extent of intra-industry trade are more likely to be selected, possibly due to easier 
acceptance by firms in the same industry. 
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
     As mentioned in Section 2, ECFA rates are systematically determined according 
to the level of MFN rates in 2009. In particular, 5% and 15% play the role of cutoffs in 
determining the magnitude of tariff reduction in the ECFA. Therefore, whether products 
have MFN rates greater than 5% or 15% may be important in selecting FTA products. 
12 
 
To examine the role of such cutoffs, instead of MFNp (t−1), the following two dummy 
variables are introduced: Dummy [0.05 < MFNp (t−1) ≤ 0.15] is a dummy variable 
taking one if MFN rates for product p range from 5% to 15% (i.e. medium MFN rates) 
and zero otherwise. Dummy [MFNp (t−1) > 0.15] takes one if MFN rates for product p 
are greater than 15% (i.e. high MFN rates) and zero otherwise. The results are reported 
in column (II) in Table 5. Interestingly, while the coefficient for the medium MFN rates 
is estimated to be significantly positive, that for the high MFN rates is insignificantly 
negative. These results may indicate that China accepts the inclusion of products with a 
medium magnitude of benefits from tariff removal, but avoids the inclusion of products 
with a large magnitude of benefits. The other variables have qualitatively the same 
results as in column (I).  
Based on this result in column (II) in Table 5, Table 6 lists the non-early harvest 
products which have a high predicted probability of selection. Namely, these products 
should have been included in the early harvest list but were excluded. In other words, 
these products might be seen as “sensitive products” for China to import from Taiwan. 
Indeed, the following products are those that Taiwanese government attempted to 
include in the early harvest list; Polypropylene, in primary forms (390210), 
Ethylene-vinyl acetate copolymers, in primary forms (390130), Poly (vinyl chloride), 
not mixed with any other substance, in primary forms (390410), and Terephthalic acid 
& its salts (291736). In this sense, it can be said that our model gives an excellent 
explanation of the potential selection of early harvest products. The list may also be 
useful for the Taiwan side when negotiations for the normal and sensitive tracks get 
underway. 
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
5.2. Results for FTA Utilization 
     Next, the results on FTA utilization, i.e., (2), are reported in Table 7. Columns (I) 
and (II) show the OLS results without and with the Mills ratio, which is obtained from 
the results in Table 5. In particular, based on the improvement of Pseudo log-likelihood 
and Pseudo R-squared, we use the Mills ratio as calculated based on the results in 
column (II) in Table 5. Furthermore, in order to take a log of dependent variables, we 
drop observations with zero FTA utilization from the sample. As a result, in Table 7, we 
can see a significantly positive result in the Mills ratio and a larger value of R-squared 
in column (II). In both equations, as is consistent with the results in all previous studies, 
tariff margin (the difference between MFN rates and ECFA rates) has a significantly 
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positive coefficient. However, there are qualitative and quantitative differences in 
coefficients in the ROO dummy between columns (I) and (II). After controlling the 
Mills ratio, all coefficients for ROO dummy variables turn out to be insignificant. In the 
sense that the results differ depending on the inclusion of the Mills ratio, it is important 
to take into account the selection process of FTA products. 
 
===   Table 7   === 
 
     Our variable of FTA Utilizationp ranges from zero to positive infinity, and thus we 
cannot take its log in the case of a zero-valued FTA Utilizationp. In order to naturally 
include such observations in our sample, equation (2) is estimated by the Poisson 
pseudo maximum likelihood technique. Such a combination of sample selection and 
Poisson regression was proposed by Greene (1994). The results of Poisson regression 
are reported in columns (III) and (IV). Again, as is consistent with the findings in the 
previous studies, a larger tariff margin encourages greater use of FTA schemes. In 
contrast to those of the OLS regression, however, we found significant coefficients for 
some ROO variables. The most restrictive rule is CH&RVCL, followed by CH/RVCH. 
The other types of ROO have statistically the same level of restrictiveness as WO. 
These results for ROO are inconsistent with our expectation that “AND-type” rules of 
origin decrease the FTA utilization more than “OR-type” rules. As a result, one possible 
interpretation is that ECFA ROOs are determined specific to products. That is, for 
example, “AND-type” ROOs are set for products that meet those ROOs naturally. 
     Our last robustness check is devoted to our definition of the dependent variable. 
Unlike that of the previous studies, the numerator of our dependent variable is the 
number of COOs issued, not exports under the FTA scheme.10 Since that number can be 
seen as a proxy for the number of exporters using the FTA scheme, the larger the 
exports per firm in an industry, the more likely our measure of FTA utilization would 
underestimate the FTA utilization compared with its measure used in the previous 
studies. In other words, the underestimation is more serious in industries where there are 
a larger number of productive firms, since the more productive firms export more 
(Melitz, 2003). In order to account for this underestimation, we control for global 
industrial competitiveness by introducing the lagged Taiwanese RCA, which is also 
included in the selection equation. The extent of our underestimation will appear as a 
                                                 
10 The definition of FTA utilization rates is different even among previous studies. Some studies 
define it as a share of trade values under FTA schemes in the total trade values or in the trade values 
of products with a positive tariff margin. The share of the number of FTA users in total firms is also 
used. 
14 
 
negative coefficient for this variable. The estimation results are reported in Table 8. The 
OLS estimation yields a significantly negative coefficient for the Taiwanese RCA, but 
the PPML estimation shows insignificant coefficients. Thus it may be possible to say 
that the underestimation in our measure of FTA utilization is not so serious (particularly 
by including industry fixed effects). The other variables have qualitatively the same 
results as in Table 7. 
 
===   Table 8   === 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we conducted an empirical investigation of the determinants of 
ECFA utilization in exports from Taiwan to China. To do this, we first estimated the 
selection equation for the kinds of products that obtained FTA preferential treatment, 
since products with FTA preferential rates are systematically chosen. As a result, we 
found that Taiwan includes products with a medium magnitude of benefits from tariff 
removal in the early harvest list, but does not succeed in including products with a large 
magnitude of benefits. Further, the products that have already been traded in substantial 
amounts are more likely to be included. Interestingly, Taiwan attempts to include 
products for which ASEAN countries have better access to the China market. In 
addition, based on the estimates, we listed the non-early harvest products which have a 
high predicted probability of selection. These products might be seen as “sensitive 
products” for China’s imports from Taiwan. Thus the list of such products will be useful 
for the Taiwan side when the negotiations for the normal and sensitive tracks get 
underway. We then estimated the equation for the determinants of FTA utilization by 
introducing an inverse of the Mills ratio, estimated in the selection equation. The 
findings are that, as usual, the FTA rates are more likely to be utilized for products with 
a larger tariff margin. Moreover, the most restrictive rule in terms of discouraging FTA 
utilization is CH&RVCL, followed by CH/RVCH. This economically inconsistent result 
for ROOs might indicate that ECFA ROOs are determined in a product-specific manner. 
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Table 1. ECFA Tariff Schedule for Taiwanese Exports to China 
Type MFN rates in 2009 (X%) 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
(I) 0 < X ≤ 5 0
(II) 5 < X ≤ 15 5 0
(III) X > 15 10 5 0  
Source: Legal text of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
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Table 2. Comparison of ECFA Rates in 2011 
TL Share TL Share TL Share
Comparison with MFN rates
Margin = 0 6 1% 6 1% 6 1%
0 < Margin ≤ 5 411 76% 72 13% 72 13%
5 < Margin ≤ 10 114 21% 339 63% 337 63%
Margin > 10 8 1% 122 23% 124 23%
Comparison with APTA rates to Korea
ECFA < Korea 502 93% 532 99% 532 99%
ECFA = Korea 8 1% 6 1% 7 1%
ECFA > Korea 29 5% 1 0% 0 0%
Comparison with ACFTA rates
ECFA < ASEAN 11 2% 16 3% 19 4%
ECFA = ASEAN 77 14% 496 92% 520 96%
ECFA > ASEAN 451 84% 27 5% 0 0%
2011 2012 2013
 
Sources: Official ECFA website, China Customs Law Firm online, China FTA Network online, 
World Integrated Trade Solution tariff database, ACFTA knowledge handbook, and MFN rates 
adjustment tables of the Department of Finance, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China 
Note: “TL” indicates the tariff line number. 
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Table 3. Utilization of FTAs in Taiwanese Exports 
TL COO Utilization
Live animals 5 647 72
Vegetable products 11 416 138
Mineral products 4 177 0.4
Chemical products 47 3,876 4
Plastics and rubber 50 12,581 5
Leather products 3 13 1,411
Textiles 115 5,893 15
Footwear 3 6 0.2
Pottery 6 170 11
Base metal 61 5,439 5
Machinery 110 13,563 6
Transport equipment 13 5,406 21
Precision machiinery 5 422 4
Miscellaneous 4 178 3  
Sources: Ministry of Economic Affairs (Taiwan), World Trade Atlas (Global Trade Information 
Services) 
Notes: This table reports figures for 2011. “TL” indicates the number of tariff lines with ECFA 
preferential tariff rates. “COO” is the number of COOs issued. “Utilization” is COO divided by 
exports (million US dollars). 
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Table 4. Changes in Taiwanese Exports to China (million US dollars) 
2009 2011 Change
Without ECFA rates 71,873 105,448 47%
With ECFA rates 13,833 19,448 41%
0 < Margin ≤ 5 12,676 17,265 36%
5 < Margin ≤ 10 1,140 2,150 89%
Margin > 10 17 33 96%  
Notes: “Margin” is the difference between ECFA rates and MFN rates for China. 
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Table 5. Probit Results of Selection Equation (Marginal Effect) 
(I) (II)
MFN (t -1) 0.063
[0.041]
Dummy [0.05 < MFN (t -1) ≤ 0.15] 0.014***
[0.004]
Dummy [MFN (t -1) > 0.15] -0.003
[0.008]
Taiwanese Exports to China (t -1) 0.009*** 0.009***
[0.001] [0.001]
Tariff Margin in ACFTA (t -1) 0.091* 0.145**
[0.055] [0.057]
Chinese RCA (t -1) 0.0001 0.0001
[0.0005] [0.0005]
Taiwanese RCA (t -1) -0.0002 -0.0003
[0.0003] [0.0003]
Intra-industry Trade (t－1) 0.011** 0.011**
[0.005] [0.005]
Number of observations 4,481 4,481
Pseudo log-likelihood -1,029 -1,017
Pseudo R2 0.2654 0.2739  
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking unity if a product is listed as an 
early-harvest product in ECFA and zero otherwise. The parentheses are robust standard errors. “***”, 
“**”, and “*” show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Industry dummy variables are 
included in all estimations. 
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Table 6. Non-Early Harvest Products with a High Probability 
HS Description Probability
390810 Polyamide-6/ -11/ -12/ -6,6/ -6,9/ -6,10/ -6,12, in primary forms 69%
390330 Acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) copolymers, in primary forms 67%
390130 Ethylene-vinyl acetate copolymers, in primary forms 64%
390210 Polypropylene, in primary forms 60%
390120 Polyethylene having a specific gravity of 0.94 or more 59%
390410 Poly (vinyl chloride), not mixed with any other substance, in primary forms 59%
400219 Styrene-butadiene rubber / carboxylated styrene-butadiene rubber (other than latex) 59%
390319 Polystyrene other than expansible, in primary forms 58%
845710 Machining centres for working metal 58%
291736 Terephthalic acid & its salts 57%
600690 Knitted/crocheted fabrics, n.e.s. in Ch.60 57%
890190 Vessels for the transport of goods & for the transport of both persons & goods 56%
890690 Vessels, n.e.s. in 89.01-8906.10, incl. lifeboats other than rowing boats 55%
854239 Other Electronic integrated circuits 54%
400220 Butadiene rubber (BR), in primary forms/in plates/sheets/strip 53%
591190 Textile products & articles, for technical uses, spec. in Note 7 to Ch.59 51%
520710 Cotton yarn containing 85%/more by weight of cotton, put up for RS 51%
540245 Other yarn of nylon/other polyamides 51%
390422 Poly (vinyl chloride), plasticised, in primary forms (excl. of 3904.10) 51%
871419 Parts & accessories of motorcycles (incl. mopeds), other than saddles 50%  
Notes: This table reports the products that are not listed in the early harvest of the ECFA but have a 
high probability of being listed among early harvest products. This probability is calculated based on 
the results provided in column (II) in Table 5. 
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Table 7. Estimation Results of ECFA Utilization 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
ln (MFN (t ) - ECFA (t )) 0.613*** 0.562*** 1.622** 1.649**
[0.164] [0.159] [0.652] [0.710]
ROO Dummy (Basis: WO)
CH/RVCL 0.231 -0.414 0.229 -0.266
[0.763] [0.836] [1.029] [1.147]
CH/RVCH 0.265 -0.901 -1.224* -2.189**
[0.646] [0.784] [0.744] [1.048]
CH -0.196 -0.876 -0.685 -1.248
[0.629] [0.723] [0.732] [0.922]
CC 1.112* 0.423 1.233** 0.695
[0.568] [0.675] [0.625] [0.767]
RVCH -0.198 -0.898 -0.609 -1.215
[0.774] [0.857] [0.977] [1.156]
CS&RVCH -0.484 -1.167 -1.124 -2.253
[0.762] [0.797] [1.159] [1.592]
CH&RVCL -0.263 -1.078 -1.907** -3.039**
[0.683] [0.769] [0.872] [1.283]
CH&RVCH 0.194 -0.471 -0.78 -1.555
[0.671] [0.746] [0.773] [1.029]
CC&RVCL 1.509** 0.892 -0.243 -0.727
[0.613] [0.708] [0.794] [0.936]
Mills ratio 0.867*** 0.563*
[0.285] [0.317]
Number of observations 381 381 423 423
R-squared 0.3431 0.3753 0.4583 0.5419
Pseudo log-likelihood -0.0869 -0.0866
OLS PPML
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of COOs issued divided by exports. The parentheses 
are robust standard errors. “***”, “**”, and “*” show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
The Mills ratio is obtained from the probit estimation, for which results are reported in column (II) in 
Table 5. Industry dummy variables are included in all estimations. 
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Table 8. Estimation Results of ECFA Utilization: Controlling Taiwanese RCA 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
ln (MFN (t ) - ECFA (t )) 0.616*** 0.570*** 1.623** 1.648**
[0.162] [0.159] [0.650] [0.707]
ROO Dummy (Basis: WO)
CH/RVCL 0.295 -0.292 0.123 -0.473
[0.780] [0.838] [1.040] [1.219]
CH/RVCH 0.253 -0.755 -1.215 -2.212**
[0.654] [0.781] [0.747] [1.058]
CH -0.205 -0.793 -0.677 -1.258
[0.636] [0.715] [0.733] [0.924]
CC 1.115* 0.515 1.235** 0.67
[0.579] [0.667] [0.624] [0.773]
RVCH 0.212 -0.571 -0.744 -1.484
[1.004] [0.975] [0.881] [1.135]
CS&RVCH -0.441 -1.053 -1.109 -2.26
[0.759] [0.791] [1.156] [1.594]
CH&RVCL -0.173 -0.92 -1.902** -3.055**
[0.692] [0.768] [0.873] [1.282]
CH&RVCH 0.241 -0.357 -0.783 -1.581
[0.674] [0.738] [0.772] [1.037]
CC&RVCL 1.307** 0.857 -0.179 -0.649
[0.626] [0.698] [0.829] [0.945]
Taiwanese RCA (t -1) -0.055*** -0.031* 0.018 0.03
[0.017] [0.017] [0.036] [0.036]
Mills ratio 0.754** 0.586*
[0.294] [0.330]
Number of observations 381 381 423 423
R-squared 0.3581 0.3797 0.4704 0.5647
Pseudo log-likelihood -0.0869 -0.0866
OLS PPML
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of COOs issued divided by exports. The parentheses 
are robust standard errors. “***”, “**”, and “*” show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
The Mills ratio is obtained from the probit estimation, for which results are reported in column (II) in 
Table 5. Industry dummy variables are included in all estimations. 
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Figure 1. ROO Types in ECFA 
 
Source: Legal text of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
Notes: CS, CH, and CC are the ROO criteria of “Change in Subheading,” “Change in Heading,” and 
“Change in Chapter,” respectively. WO indicates the “Wholly obtained” criterion. RVCL and RVCH 
are the ROO criteria for the less than 40% real value-added and the greater than 40% real 
value-added, respectively. 
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